Something Wiki This Way Comes

Greek Words Relating to Rhetoric

Peitho—“persuasion” p. 8 of Pernot; paired with logos p. 170 of Fleming, “Rhetoric as a Course of Study”
Dunamis—p. 177 of Fleming
Progymnasmata—p. 179, 184 of Fleming
Logon paideia—p. 180 of Fleming
Pharmakon—"drug" used of persuasive speech, p. 73 of Susan Jarratt, “Rhetoric” in Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures. Ed. David G. Nicholls; cf. Gorgias Encomium 13
Theorin—“to see,” root of theory p. 76 of Susan Jarratt, “Rhetoric” in Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures
Phronesis—p. 82 of Susan Jarratt, “Rhetoric” in Introduction to Scholarship in Modern Languages and Literatures
Eikos—“probability”, n. 4 p. 253 Kennedy
Eudoxia—“good repute” p. 59 Kennedy
Boule—“counsel” p. 3, 25 of Pernot
Paraiphasis—“encouragement” p. 3 of Pernot
Ephetme—“behest” p. 3 of Pernot
Medea—“plans” p. 3 of Pernot
Sumphrazesthai—“to consult together” p. 3 of Pernot
Keleuein—“to exhort, to order” p. 3 of Pernot
Polutropus—“of many turns,” an epithet of Odysseus, p. 5 of Pernot
Deinotes—“virtuosity” p. 6 of Pernot
Sophistai—p. 12 Pernot
Dissoi logoi—p. 13 of Pernot
Epideixeis—p. 15 of Pernot
Paignion—“plaything, amusement, jeu d’esprit” p. 256 Kennedy, p. 16 Pernot
Isokola—“parallel structure” p. 18 of Pernot
Antitheseis—“antitheses” p. 18 of Pernot
Paronoumasiai—use of alliteration, assonance, wordplay p. 251 Kennedy, p. 18 of Pernot
Homoioteleuta—rhyme p. 18 of Pernot
Rhetoreia—“eloquence” p. 22 of Pernot
Logon tekhnai—“skill of speeches” p. 22 of Pernot
Dike—“justice,” “private suit” p. 24 of Pernot
Graphe—“public suit” p. 24 of Pernot
Bema—“podium” p. 25 of Pernot
Misthos—“stipend” p. 26 of Pernot
Epitaphios logos—“funeral oration” p. 26 of Pernot

Revisiting What Rhetoric Means to Me

Put here any observations about how a month's work with Sophists and Plato changes your outlook on rhetoric or your definition or your application.
Remember to post Plato wrap-ups to Dan's former thread.

Plato's Rhetorical Choices

I know it's late (40 min till class!), but I want to start a thread devoted to analyzing Plato from a rhetorical standpoint, as Poster recommends: "reading Plato rhetorically." I think this is a wide open area in which all our topics can fit, but with their focus on the ways in which Plato, or Socrates, sets up, defines and defends his arguments.

Blog Anxiety: Plato's Solemn Silence

I like that Dr. Romano uses the word anxiety when talking about rhetoric. I can describe my relationship to any on-line dialoguing with the word "anxiety." I don't post anywhere on-line because of what Plato (okay, via Socrates) says about the "solemn silence" of the written word. My daily rhetorical situation is at West Mesa High School where the oral discourse I engage in goes something like this: Chris, stop thwacking your cheek and making that popping noise. Tiffany, give me the cell phone. Miguel, you cannot write and talk at the same time so please stop talking and start writing. (I do this because the public educational system requires that somebody teach the students how to sit in chairs. But that is another blog.) The written discourse centers on student produced sentences like "And that's what I think about that" and trying to engage 16-year-old students in parallelism in the Declaration of Independence. So my usage of academic language and my opportunities to write in any scholarly fashion have been minimal for five years now. Hence my anxiety when responding to this, or any other, blog or forum or mailing list, etc. I worry that not only do I sound like an idiot child, but also that I might come off sounding as if I know what I am talking about. The problem with the written word (and I am not in any way dismissing writing or aligning myself with Plato/Socrates' idea that writing is ONLY an image of the real discourse of the spoken word--I think writing is multfaceted and cannot be defined or situated in only one way) is that "the speaker" can be perceived as giving only "one unvarying answer" that "once written down, [can be] tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand..."

Various FAQs floating around about internet etiquette speak to the problem of on-line personas that cannot be questioned, the difficulty of conveying tone in the written response, the problem of delayed responses (I cannot immediately correct myself, or interpret body language to know that my tone and/or words have been wrong or misunderstood). I worry about all of this the minute I post something. I haven't mentioned it before because it seems particularly feminine to worry about such things. But Plato via Socrates gave me the words...

The Plato artifact, or what I learned from English 542 students today

Taking the authorial/initiator position, I’d like to tell you what I gleaned from today’s conversation.

The artifact we excavated referred to as Phaedrus and attributed to one Plato (constructed as male in the literature) is a valuable find because the form itself appears to have challenged the primacy of a form we would call (with due deference to the impossibility of translation) “popular drama” or “popular oral performance” (this observation I place in the mouth of Robbie). This apparently innovative form (we have to remember that antecedents were located among the Sophistic fragments or may have been lost—or “unsaved” as in the case of women’s or non-Greek discourse), this written, simulator-of-the-oral dialogue, points to the limitations of language even as it lays claim to the awful seductive power of language. It is thus built directly on the very kind of discourse it denigrate and undermines its loud and insistent claims for separation from that bad discourse. We might say then that the accusations against certain kinds and forms of mesmerizing speech and against writing itself are dismissed summarily by the form itself, a written form whose stupefying effects are masked under a construct of clarity and analysis, an effect wrought by a forceful projection of dialectic—by way of medium and topic.

So on the one hand, the dialogue seduces by creating the illusion of a new and powerful way of collective knowledge making—specifically, knowledge making about language, yet it prevents us from understanding language because it exemplifies fully its contradictory character: it imitates contemporaneous oral/gesture drama even as it denigrates imitation; it draws on cultural memory to formulate an argument against cultural memory. It inserts into history “real persons” –oops—the imitations of real persons (what we would call representations), and this in itself is a powerful form of seduction, seduction into a elite group of interlocutors who speak in special ways about language, who practice language in special ways, and who are made willing to engage in confrontational dialogue about these practices and speeches. People have believed in this fiction for centuries upon centuries. Thus Phaedrus carves out an imaginary speech territory where contending-with-words men are invited to assent to a new way of contending-with-words. Perhaps this artifact is really an advertisement for the Academy: Come my beauties and here you will learn the arts of dialectic (this is an observation I attribute to Sarah, who may reject or accept my fiction). The Phaedrus masks this seduction into a language practice by foregrounding carnal seduction and working towards its legitimation (this I place in the mouth of Gerard, with emendations), thus distracting the audience while simultaneously suggesting that love and discourse are of the same order of things (bottom line thinking for Soc. is figuring out the fine lines between concepts) even as it guilelessly arguing that they are not.

Clearly reading Plato can drive one to madness.

I guess I will start this one!

I thought the Poster article made a lot of good points and addressed a lot of the concerns we have been discussing in class. One of the angles I was particularly interested was Poster’s statement:

“Even more worrisome is a tendency that some rhetoricians share with traditionalist and analytic interpreters to assume that any statement made by the Socratic character in a dialogue can be excerpted from its context and prefaced by the phrases “Plato says” or “Plato believes.” But the words uttered by the Socratic character in a dialogue can no more be assumed to be the “beliefs” of Plato than those uttered by a character in Shakespeare’s plays can be assumed to represent Shakespeare’s beliefs.”

On reflection I realize that I often find myself writing those same statements that Poster cautions against. It is an easy assumption to make, particularly when you are not intimately familiar with these texts. After all, as modelers of the way rhetoric should work, these Socratic figures often make forceful statements and back them up with solid support. I think part of this tendency to mistake these statements as Platonic opinion is a result of the style of discourse Plato used—being more an oral tradition rather than a written one. It would have been much more difficult to make this mistake if heard aloud. Another problem is the tendency of people to approach these texts with the intent to define and analyze. As Poster said, it would be better to look at the work as a whole (or the entire body of works) before making any judgments. Unfortunately, I think this is very hard to do, particularly in a setting such as academia where scholars are encouraged to make judgments on nuances and subtext as or more frequency than the big picture. In this class certainly, I believe it would be difficult to completely take Poster’s approach to reading Plato and other rhetoricians. It is a great approach, but one that would require much longer study than we have, and much more familiarity with the subject. As much as I agree with Poster’s caution over making these types of analysis, I can also see how making these assumptions, and then realizing their shortcomings, is both an inevitable and valuable component to understanding the texts on a deeper level.

Phaedrus and Carol Poster

This post is meant to simply anchor responses to this week's readings, given that some people have had trouble initiating posts. So please "launch" by commenting from here if you wish--or do a "new post." Either will work. I recommend signing in to blogger BEFORE you try to comment, as this seems to make things a little simpler. Go to blogger.com and you'll get a prompt. And be sure to compose off line so that you don't lose your good observations via instability on the blogger site.

Topics:
--How the Phadrus advances our understanding of Plato's interest in rhetoric.
--What Poster has to say about how to study the dialogues and how not to study them.

Philosopher King: Hegemon or Totalitarian?

Kaufman tells us that Plato suggested the idea of a philosopher king whose sole aim is the good of the state, and who should be supported without question because only he (she?) knows what's best. Given the confines that Plato allows for--that we are all human and therefore, cannot be perfect--this seems to be a prescription for attendance to the most good for the largest number of people. This concept is at the heart of democracy, if I'm not mistaken (which is entirely possible--I'm no expert on philosophies of governing).

It's interesting, then, that Plato's conception of government sounds more like totalitarianism, in so far as that we are supposed to subjugate ourselves to the philosopher king, regardless of our personal experiences, needs, or desires. But what is not clear is how this philosopher king is supposed to come to power. Does he take the part of the totalitarian, to take power, enforcing his will on others because he "knows" better? What about the notion of power as a corrupting force? How could he stay true to the good of all if he were corrupted by power?

What about the concept of hegemony, then? My understanding of hegemony is that, similar to the philosopher king, the hegemon rules without question, but unlike the totalitarian, he is placed in power, literally called upon to sacrifice himself for the good of all, by the people. So which is Plato arguing for? If there were some indication that he favored using power to take control, I missed it. So is he in favor of hegemony? Is he, in fact, covertly trying to position himself so that the people will call upon him to be the hegemon?

History of Rhetoric

In the initial post, this caught my eye:
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes in the section on Protagoras that “the term ‘sophist’ gradually acquired the negative connotation of cleverness not restrained by ethics.”

This seems to be the overall impression of rhetoric in most of what we have read. The ancient/classical personalities we have been looking at are quite willing to admit to there being such a thing as "rhetoric" but they mostly seem to be looking down at the field. Indeed, Plato has Socrates questioning the validity of calling rhetoric a Techne, in Gorgias. It seems that this idea of a "lack of ethics" is the major distinction of rhetoric being valid. And, since the Sophists major tool was rhetoric, they have become intertwined. I find it amusing, however, that Plato's Socrates is using rhetoric to discredit rhetoric.

As for Helen, and the arguments made for and against her, I don't know as we can truly discuss her role in what happened. The story itself has been so intertwined with Greek mythology, that the idea of Helen has become greater than the woman herself. We can only, really, discuss what is said about her by others.

As jmz said "He [Gorgias] is very subtle in how he first exalts her [Helen's] parentage--her mother being Leda, her father being Zeus--in order to instill a sense of reverence within an audience (at least in my view this seems the case)." What better way to draw in people (literally, to the discussion, or into the story itself,) than to set up the character as a half goddess? Who wants to hear the story of "Helen the Mortal" instead of "Helen of Troy, half Goddess, daughter of Zeus, whose beauty launched a thousand ships." This is Rhetoric in action. Now was this Cleverness without ethics? Or was this truly the belief of the times, that Helen was indeed daughter of Zeus? That the entire Trojan War was wrapped up in a golden apple that read "To The Fairest"? Can we make that call?

Kauffman's interpretations

The interpretation that Kauffman presents of Plato's theory of rhetoric certainly raises questions. Kauffman says, "What is good for the state will be good for the individual." (p. 107) He goes on to say, "The philosopher becomes a ruler not out of an urge for power but in order to perfect the community." (p. 107) However, it is not clear how this philosopher is chosen. Certainly the people can't choose him because they are not perfect enough! By what measure is the philosopher deemed good and trustworthy of perfecting the community and not seeking power for himself?
Using Kauffman's interpretation of Plato, one could argue the case that Naziism is a form of justice. Kauffman writes that rhetoric "must always be used to serve the ends of justice, which for Plato, means that it must work to further the establsihed order. . . . Justice is, very simply, hierarchical order." (p. 113) The rhetor, says Kauffman, is allowed to lie, censor, and deceive. He continues by saying that rhetoric "has as its sole aim the regulation of conduct by eliminating choice through lies, censorship, and deception." (p. 115) So, it seems that Plato steps back to the Sophists and simultaneously forward to George Orwell's 1984.

Plato's Gorgias

In Plato’s Gorgias, Gorgias delimits rhetoric to law courts, political meetings and speeches, but Socrates, as Kauffman points out, “extends the art . . . to the entire domain of influential discourse” (103). Kauffman’s point is that Plato saw a certain kind of rhetoric as useful to the state for the way it could influence “the masses” to behave, even think, in a certain way. But Socrates’ (Plato’s) point in the Gorgias seems to be to dilute rhetoric so thoroughly that it becomes meaningless. But does he succeed?
Of course Gorgias has to go along with what Socrates says, because Plato is pulling the strings. But when Socrates points out that all teachers, no matter what their subject, engage in rhetoric to persuade their students, wouldn’t Gorgias use that as a point for rhetoric? Yes, teachers of math and medicine persuade, but wouldn’t their teaching be that much better if they were trained rhetors? If rhetoric is concerned with discourse, as Gorgias says, can’t anyone who’s business involves discourse be improved by it? Socrates, it seems, is trying to prove that Gorgias’ trade is too broadly defined to be useful, and that, because it can claim no skill that it doesn’t share with another discipline, it cannot really be a discipline at all. I think Socrates merely succeeds in showing that rhetoric is applicable to many other skills, and this, to me, is proof of its value.

My Encomium Experience

I love words. I love how they sound, how they feel on the tongue. I love that we speak of a well-worded phrase as "well crafted." It can imply both the tekhne (artistic element) and wit or play (craftiness) of the writer/speaker.

So I began my reading of this pieces somewhat expectant of the craft of Gorgias and the care of the translator. Kennedy says, "The translation...seeks to imitate features of [Gorgias'] style, including antitheses, assonance, a fondness for parallel phrases or clauses with an equal number of syllables, and word play."

Perhaps it is my fondness for wordcraft that predisposes me to this idea, but I don't believe (as Kennedy and some classmates indicate) that the wordplay, or Gorgias' enjoyment of it, is meant to diminish the seriousness of the subject. I think instead it is meant to give equal value to speech and myth. The famous retellings of the epic stories were often (if not always) set in verse, precisely worded and witty.

I find throughout the speech recurring references to speech, language, and words. Part of this is clearly stylistic, the speaker drawing attention to the speech (which is not an aspect of contemporary speech-making or writing). Some examples occur in #2, where Gorgias mentions "the function of a single speaker," again at #5 when he apologizes for the length of the introduction and prepares to "proceed to the intended speech," and in the much-maligned #20 where he concludes with a recap of his intent in the careful crafting of the speech.

But there are other references that I think cast some light on the idea that the wordplay is at least as serious a matter as the subject at hand.

One phrase I find most interesting is "by giving some logic to language." I have to stop here and wonder what word Gorgias used for each of these ideas--would it have been logos? He appears to have used logos throughout the speech to mean several different things. Would that, in itself, have been a form of wordplay? Unfortunately I am forced to use only the English translation and so my reading is colored by what I think he might mean.

I feel that the phrase has a double meaning, one to style and one to intent. I think the first meaning is a foreshadowing of his final statement--that the speech is a deliberate, if droll, tribute to Helen. The second, I think, is more the more direct meaning--following a prescribed form of logic and argument to make a case through the use of words.

Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen is an example of sophist rhetoric in its clever argument absolving Helen of any responsibility for her abduction by Paris. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes in the section on Protagoras that “the term ‘sophist’ gradually acquired the negative connotation of cleverness not restrained by ethics.” Gorgias’ proposition is that Helen was abducted by Paris by the will of the gods or fate, by force, by, words, or by love. “I wish, by giving some logic to language, to free the accused of blame,” Gorgias says. I ask: is Gorgias not abandoning the classical Greek belief that humans can reason and use logic?

His second argument is that if she was assaulted, she has suffered. I ask: if she was so assaulted and insulted, why did she not try to defend herself against Paris’ advances and make some attempt to escape?
Gorgias makes another argument that perhaps Helen was talked into following Paris – “was carried off by speech just as if constrained by force? Her mind was swept away by persuasion.” I ask: was Helen so empty-headed that she believed all she was told, never questioned Paris’ words, and fell under his spell without considering the consequences of her decisions and actions?

Gorgias’ final argument is that love caused Helen to fall for Paris. I ask: are you not placing Helen on a level with animals which react to natural impulses without thought or reason, for they are incapable of thought or reason?

Gorgias then concludes his speech by saying, “I have tried to refute the injustice of defamation and the ignorance of allegation. I wished to write a speech that would be Helen’s encomium and my own paignion.” Paignion is defined in the footnote as “plaything, amusement.” I ask: are we – the readers of this speech – being played for fools as you ask us to accept these arguments?