The interpretation that Kauffman presents of Plato's theory of rhetoric certainly raises questions. Kauffman says, "What is good for the state will be good for the individual." (p. 107) He goes on to say, "The philosopher becomes a ruler not out of an urge for power but in order to perfect the community." (p. 107) However, it is not clear how this philosopher is chosen. Certainly the people can't choose him because they are not perfect enough! By what measure is the philosopher deemed good and trustworthy of perfecting the community and not seeking power for himself?
Using Kauffman's interpretation of Plato, one could argue the case that Naziism is a form of justice. Kauffman writes that rhetoric "must always be used to serve the ends of justice, which for Plato, means that it must work to further the establsihed order. . . . Justice is, very simply, hierarchical order." (p. 113) The rhetor, says Kauffman, is allowed to lie, censor, and deceive. He continues by saying that rhetoric "has as its sole aim the regulation of conduct by eliminating choice through lies, censorship, and deception." (p. 115) So, it seems that Plato steps back to the Sophists and simultaneously forward to George Orwell's 1984.
16 comments:
I had the same response to Kauffman’s Plato as Helen. It seems so contradictory to say that the "good" of the state is the "good" of the individual and only philosopher kings can provide good leadership because only they know the truth AND have the proper and right rhetorical skills gained through rigorous dialectics (did I get all of that right?). And yet, even though they are supposedly superior in "goodness," they can lie and deceive the great unwashed and still be deemed as more fit to lead. It reminded me, too, of 1984, and also Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, i.e., leaders who assume that those they lead are too stupid and too weak to serve their own interests.
About 20 years ago I read the Republic (I believe), just to see what Plato was all about. I remember feeling confused and also a little annoyed. I certainly did not know what I was reading and believed the irritation I felt was probably due to my lack of education and ability to read Plato correctly. However, I felt a little annoyed again with Plato’s Socrates and his approach. For several years now, when someone mentions they use the Socratic method of teaching, I feel secretly guilty because it always sounds awful. I don’t like the idea of leading my students by the nose to the answer I want. I would much rather just be straightforward and tell them what I want them to know. I also prefer to be taught this way. I can reject whatever I want later, but I want to be told what the accepted belief system is directly first. But I am only a mere first year rhetoric student and I surely must be reading his tone wrong, right? To me, he sounds hopelessly snarky and very condescending. If I was Gorgias, even if I was a malignant and manipulative Sophist, I would lose patience with this method. Is this a historical situation that I don’t understand? Or an accepted writing genre of the times?
I can sympathize with both Helen and Daniella's reactions to the inherent difficulties in comprehending/accepting Plato's view of justice. His view seems inevitably circular in arguing that if one accepts the premise that reason is the highest and most prized element in human beings, then those who possess it to the highest degree can then--through dialectic and knowledge of the Forms--govern others who do not have the faculty to an equal degree.
The consequent of this argument is also difficult to accept since Plato contends that the Ideas of, say, Justice or Virtue or Goodness, are eternal and purely intellectual (no "real-world" experiences are counted as being part of knowledge). For me, the contention that one can govern justly without attention to circumstance or contingency is inconceivable. While Kauffman's reading is pretty harsh, it might be a category mistake for Plato to maintain that "eternal Ideas" can be imposed on temporal beings who would know no better (like divine command theory).
In regard to Daniella's "awful" feeling about the Socratic method: I think when this is used in academia today it really refers to dialectic generally and not the sort of sneaky 'leading by the nose' in Plato that, nevertheless, is the origin of the term.
True dialectic, I think, is problematic in that it can never lead to ultimate truth as understood by Plato, despite what his claims for dialectic. The episteme of the Forms does not derive from rational inquiry (which can never transcend the contigent subjectivities of the dialecticians in question) but through an intuitive anamnesis, as Plato acknowledges elsewhere. This is usually cultivated only after a tentative pistis in those already initiated; however, as has been pointed out in Kauffman and in the posts here, Plato affords these Guardians an excessive fascistic power over the uninitiated. How else could it be, though, if a society founded on a gnosis of qualitative Essence is to remain intact?
In response to--is it Jeremy?--'s last post: would a fidelity to the Ideas really preclude the ability to successfully apply them in contingent circumstances? If one acts truthfully all the time, for instance, must that necessitate a political failure at some point? Or, perhaps fidelity to the Ideas is MORE IMPORTANT than whether they work out to one's material benefit in a given situation: should we make an Idol/Ideal of Kairos?
I haven't read much (any) Plato, and I found Kauffman's argument fascinating and—given my ignorance—hard to refute. So, without even really thinking about it, I was hunting for material in the Gorgias that was familiar from Kauffman. It's clear that Plato (via his Socrates) values big-T Truth—is this the same as absolute truth? I think it is. And I also think that the kind of elitism, even fascism, that Kauffman finds in Plato is symptomatic of the most extreme big-T thinking. Maybe that's too broad a thing to say, or too touchy a place. . . .
With his philosopher king system of governance, Plato chooses someone like himself to rule over everyone else. He didn't appoint a plumber king, or a humble carpenter king, but a philosopher king, because he, Plato, is right. He has the answers; he has the big-T. When one person is convinced of his absolute rightness, everyone else is wrong. And when everyone else is wrong, the person with the Truth has the right (the responsibility) to show them the way, no matter how forcefully because, after all, it's for their own good.
One reason for this, I think, is the tendency for big-T thinkers to see the world in which we live as a secondary place, a place in space and time that is only meant as a prelude to something more, or that is only a shadow of the real. So, then, what does it matter if you make someone's life wretched: this life is not what really matters.
If Susan's intention was to see if we read Kauffman into Plato, I think she has her answer.
Dan, I wasn't sure if I was supposed to read Kauffman first, or read Plato first...so I have gone back and forth. I'm actually glad we started the class with Fleming who completely "confused" me because I didn't know any of the people or concepts he was talking about. It gave me a healthy dose of skepticism with which to approach Kauffman.
I honestly don't know what to make of the secondary sources, especially in light of the conversation with Gerard in class the other day. Everyone in the "business" of rhetoric is going to have a different opinion based on their own readings, their chosen and their own understanding of the terms. What I'd really like to do in class is to begin hashing through some of those terms and getting a pile of different definitions for each. Then I might be better equiped for the analysis I feel I should be making of the secondary sources.
I agree with you, Sarah, and with Gerard. All these filters of translation and time sometimes make me feel like I'm engaging in a pointless conversation with these ancient texts. If my timeline is correct (and it may not be), these texts weren't even translated from the ancient Greek, or brought to the larger world at all, untill 800 or so years after they were written. And then those secondary texts were translated and handled and mishandled . . . It seems silly to talk about Gorgias' or Plato's or Isocrates' "intention" in using a particular word when they may or may not have actually used it!
On the other side of that, though, is that these texts, no matter what their status, are rich enough to yield all these different readings. No matter what the originals said or what the authors thought, these ideas are inexaustible. We have what we have, and we can do our best to, as you said, Sarah, compile long lists of definitions and then jump into the discussion. The more I think about this, the more I like Susan's wiki idea. It would be nice to have a single place to go where we could see the ways different scholars and different rhetors have used all these words that seem to have so many meanings.
If you have had an opportunity to look at today's "Daily Lobo," there is a column by Richard M. Berthold, retired professor of classical history at UNM. The column is entitled "UNM politics puts students 2nd." In his final paragraph, he talks about how the ancient Greeks have influenced our thinking. "Finally, basic to Western culture is an idea discovered by the Greeks - the notion of the individual. This curious value that the individual human has a value and dignity quite apart from the group and from heaven is in theory a defining element of our culture, . . ." Kauffman, I think, would be quick to point out that not all Greeks embraced the "notion of the individual" and would hold up Plato as his Exhibit A. He quotes from Plato's "Gorgias," "Statesman," "Laws," and "Phaedrus" and does build a convincing case for his views. Has Kauffman's work influenced other scholars of Plato and rhetoric? Are there students of rhetoric who are revisiting the theories about Plato's rhetoric? Are the popular views that Kauffman refers to in his opening paragraph being re-evaluated or is Kauffman the only pioneer in his views?
Picking up with dcryer's point of agreement with me, that engaging in discourse about ancient texts is pointless, I want to bring in the idea of intentional fallacy.
I believe in the intentional fallacy, and so I try to avoid getting mired in revealing authorial intent. Filters are just part of the picture. And as a result, I think that I group translators with novelists, or at least I think they intersect.
So regardless of intent, which I think should be ignored. I try to approach any text, be it the Republic or Sophie's Choice as sources for discourse and thought, and also as sources of pieces of Truth. For example, I think that reading the novel, Sophie's Choice, I can learn as much about World War II, as a reputable history book can teach. And I agree with Kauffman and further on Plato. I think Plato contains some pieces of Truth that have endured and have been adopted by fascists: "[The statesman] may purge the city for its better health by putting some of its citezens to death or banishing others" (113).
Regardless of the intent of Plato or the translator, here is an idea that has been made concrete by some readers and worthy of talking about.
There was a set of definitions in the Kauffman reading that I found interesting thinking (dianoia) vs knowledge (episteme). It seems that this would be an easy set of terms to seperate yet as I read I found myself thinking back to these definitions often. The ability to think and obtain knowledge in the public setting was highly regarded. These two words seem to be the way members of society earned agency. A quote that seems to support this theory is "Plato's concern for episteme is not simply intellectual curiosity about the structure of the cosmos. Rather, he believes that genuine knowledge carries with it an ethical obligation to convey the truth to others." (105) Does Plato believe that sopishts needed to have episteme to be true teachers??
Danielle—when I first started teaching (just last year), I started hearing about using Socratic method in the classroom, and having never read any Plato, I didn't know what that meant really. After hearing a few discussions and reading a few articles (but not Plato), I came to believe that it meant removing the "authority" of the teacher and helping students to find their own answers to things. It never involved leading them to the answers that I wanted them to get to, though. But after reading Plato's Gorgias, my understanding has changed. Like you, I was disappointed when I read Plato. I expected it to be this enlightening experience that would lead me to a profound understanding of something—I wasn't sure what. Instead, I found myself annoyed at the seemingly dishonest treatment of the conversation. It is clearly one-sided and biased. Far from allowing students to discover **truths** for themselves, we are "led by the nose" as you put it, to the TRUTH that Socrates (or Plato) wants us to see.
On a related note, I have a question for which, perhaps, there is no answer. Where does Socrates end and Plato begin? Is all of Plato just a recording of Socrates' ideas, or does his start speaking for himself in later works? Where is the separation, if there is one?
Not to be stymied by 'intentional fallacy' (for what can we really do with a text if we ratify that doctrine), we might consider that Plato was to some degree self-deconstructing, projecting these Ideas which he thought it of importance to inquire about, but which ultimately he realized were impossible or at least problematic to implement in the world.
Neither Socrates nor Plato really practiced in the political arena anything to positively counter those practices of the Sophists that they adjudged as "shameful;" Socrates merely acted as a counter-cultural gadfly (hence his execution for corrupting Athenian youth). If he had acted as a real participant in state affairs rather than behind the scenes as a critical voice, would he have met that fate?
On Tim's question, Where does Socrates end and Plato begin? This may be impossible to disambiguate given the paucity of extant extra-Platonic material on Socrates' teaching. Xenophon did a version of a Symposium with Socrates, just as did Plato. The satiric treatment of Socrates in Aristophanes' The Clouds can't be taken as serious evidence of his actual teachings, even though parts of it were quoted against Socrates at his trial. The Apologia by Plato may be a more or less accurate transcript of Socrates' self-defense--if so, it does seem that at least the kernel of a dogma about the Ideal Forms was intrinsic to Socrates' thought.
I actually started reading Plato first and got stuck about halfway through- unable to make meaning about what exactly was being said. Fortunately, Kauffman helped me on the points I got stuck on. It wasn't that the arguments presented in Plato's Gorgias we even confusing- but the way they were presented was. I was grateful to have a guide of sorts. It was nice yet also annoying to have an expert showing you what you missed.
He also included a summary and his analysis of Plato's works. Which is going to help see all his writings in context and puts all the vital information in one short, succinct writing. So we can use it as a key- but it is equally important to discover it for ourselves. Until I read Kauffman, I did not realize that I had heard Plato's idea of Utopia and totalitarian government before. It was hard to make connections Plato's writing to other information because it is easy to get lost in the words and way he presents his ideas- at least in Gorgias.
Also, like Tammy mentioned that the vocabulary that Kauffman helps us to define is an essential tool to help us decode Plato.
I just spent an hour composing a response that was so freaking brilliant you all would have nominated me for philosopher king, but I was foiled by technology. All that genius obliterated at the click of a "publish your comment" button. I highly recommend composing in Word or something, and not in this comment box. "Copy and paste" is my new philosophy.
Anyway, as I was saying, Kauffman is really helpful. I get from him the distinction Plato makes between dialectic and rhetoric. Dialectic is the discovery phase in which definitions are created so we can tell the masses what to think. Then the rhetor, or philosopher-king, tells some stories (lies) that lull the masses into a compliant frame of mind. It's beautiful, and obviously still works like a charm.
I was also making some comments about Plato's "notion that names imitate the properties of the thing they name" (Kauffman 110). I think this is, in fact, the way people tend to relate to language. It takes something, I said, for the average person to step back and wonder if the person he/she is speaking to defines particular words in the same way he/she does.
Does anyone else get the cold shivers when they look at the definition Kaufman lifts from Socrates for justice?
Justice, in this reading, (which I am not quibbling with; it fits my reading of Plato and Socrates with a few caveats) is that which insures that the drones of the work force are contented to and obey their given lot. How very different that is from how we conceptualize justice. Isn't it?
I suppose, if I were to be defining it, it would be that set of actions which convince people that their actions (whether pleasant and helpful or unpleasant and discriminatory) toward their fellow beings will have an effect on their own lives and well-beings. Therefore, for an example of the negative, justice in the court system is that which convinces the offender that their actions have a consequence aversive enough to make it difficult to continue doing them... within limits. Obviously, the dead cannot learn, and torture tends only to convince the person being tortured to fear the torturer.
As such, the definition given of justice, from a philosopher who bills himself as having the ability to perform correction on something as nebulous as the soul is troubling. From my own experience with trying to be helpful to people, I believe that there are times where a little well placed advice or aid can make a difference in more than just circumstance, although circumstance is the only place it can be measured, it makes a difference in the way someone is. (Or develops, given that I am teaching them something at a formative stage.) However, such events are rare, at best, and I would be hard-pressed to attempt to make something systematic out of them, as Socrates has attempted to.
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