Please prepare for Tuesday's class (October 23) by selecting a chapter from Book 1, a phrase, a term, or set of terms that interest you and formulating a question or comment that either illuminates the text, brings it into the 21st century, or asks us to help puzzle it out.
Post these AND bring your short post to class; we'll use these to make our way "into" Aristotle, Book 1.
16 comments:
Looks like I am first again!
One passage that I recorded in my notes functions as a further definition of Rhetoric:
“…rhetoric is a combination of analytical knowledge and knowledge of characters and that on one hand it is like dialectic, on the other like sophistic discourses.”
(Chapter 4, number 5. --pg 53 in my book)
As I understood it, this means a balance between knowing what you intend to argue (analytical knowledge) and knowing your audience to ensure your message will be correctly interpreted (knowledge of characters). As to the contrast between dialectic and sophistic discourses, dialectic deals with questioning to reach the true argument, while sophistic discourse more with the means of communicating this?
I still feel like I am missing his main point. What do other people think?
I think sophistic discourse is concerned, in part, with the means of communicating an argument. Kennedy says on p. 11 about speeches, “In the former, more sophistic type, it was a way of holding the audience’s attention while demonstrating a method.” Kennedy goes on to point out on p. 12, “Aristotle was trying to create a theoretical and systematic art of dialectic to replace an unscientific sophistic eristic.” The footnote says, “’Eristic’ is a derivative of eris, ‘strife,’ and refers to argument for the sake of argument with little recourse to sound logic.” So, I think sophistic discourse is concerned with the means of communicating an argument and also with the manipulation of logic in order to reach a desired end.
I am interested in what Aristotle says about using paradigms and enthymemes in speeches. “Speeches using paradigms are not less persuasive, but those with enthymemes excite more favorable audience reaction.” (p. 40) I looked at the definition of a paradigm – Kennedy says it is “inductive argument from example.” (Glossary) Enthymeme he defines as “a rhetorical syllogism.” He defines a syllogism as “a deductive argument in dialectic consisting of major premise, minor premise, and conclusion.” The Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines syllogism as “a deductive scheme of a formal argument consisting of a major and a minor premise and a conclusion (as in “every virtue is laudable; kindness is a virtue; therefore kindness is laudable”).” The dictionary defines paradigm as “1: EXAMPLE, PATTERN; especially : an outstandingly clear or typical example or archetype.”
So, in considering why Aristotle believes “enthymemes excite more favorable audience reaction,” I think it is because the audience is led through the reasoning, the logical process rather than being given an example. I think you can frequently find an example that does not work in the way that the speaker’s example does. In contrast, going through a process of a=b, b=c, therefore a=c, helps you to buy into the conclusion more fully than citing examples. So, with enthymeme, I think the audience is led to discover the conclusion for themselves.
Therein, lies the power.
Induction and Paradigm
According to Aristotle, induction is a term associated with dialectic, and paradigm with rhetoric. In much the same way that enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, paradigm is a rhetorical induction.
"To show on the basis of many similar instances that something is so is in dialectic induction and in rhetoric paradigm" (40).
"[Paradigm] is reasoning neither from part to whole nor from whole to part but from part to part" (43). After this quote, the example of Dionysius plotting tyranny is given.
Now, inductive reasoning implies inferring a generalized conclusion from particular instances, as opposed to deductive reasoning, which derives particular information from general principles. Because induction involves a generalization, it is seen as logically unsound.
Just like enthymeme is a less formal expression of a syllogism—one with the major premise omitted and understood—paradigm is a less formal expression of induction, expressed in parallels.
Alyssa, I am having trouble finding a "point". If these are indeed his lecture notes, then his point was likely not kept here, but in his head.
I am finding the lack of substance to be very frustrating.
My apologies is this posts twice:
I find the Aristotle to be disappointing. Since I don't have much of a grasp of the greek terms going in to this reading, it's very slow going in the first chapter.
So I've honestly been skipping around. There doesn't seem to be a logical progression from idea to idea. After moving forward and back through the chapters, I've settled on Chapter 5, which I'm calling The Pursuit of Happiness.
Of course I can't completely agree with Aristotle's ideas about what define happiness, but I can at least see where he is coming from. The idea that "Both to an individual privately and to all people generally there is one goal(which, he expounds, is happiness; 5.1)" is echoed in our own belief that all people deserve the right to pursue happiness, both public and private. I'm sure I'm not unprecedented in assuming that this is where our famous inscription to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" originated.
This happiness ideal seems largely tied in Aristotle's chapter to the polis--through good birth which includes the city or nation, wealth which includes private property ownership, and good reputation which places the pursuer in the public eye. Honor also seems tied to the public through governmental grants and societal gifts.
ERRGGG! Blogging is frustrating!! I find myself, again, having nothing to say. It’s not that I dislike the reading or that I don’t learn from the reading, I just have no comment to make. **All** of this is new information to me and I haven’t found my “grad school groove” yet. I don’t want to report out, as in “Aristotle says blah blah blah,” but I don’t have anything even slightly interesting to say in response to him. I have moments, like SL, of recognition (“pursuit of happiness”) and moments of seeing Aristotle in our current composition requirements (proposition followed by supporting reason, even if it isn’t exactly in the form of the defined enthymeme), but I have no intellectual news. I feel like I am in a gathering stage right now; I just want to read and digest. I keep telling myself that in a few weeks, months, years, I will have something to add to the conversation, but I am still trying to make the jump from my normal speech (where I say at least 10 times a day, “please sit down and do your work.”) to academic thought and writing. I’m not particularly troubled by this process—I know I will make the jump. But in the meantime, I have nothing to show for myself.
I have to admit I enjoyed the introduction reading far more than Aristotle's work. There was a great deal of dense text to read so I skimmed through a lot of it. I did find a statement in Book 1 Chapter 1 that seemed interesting to discuss in light of many of our class discussions regarding rhetoric as an art.
That other writers describe as an art things outside the subject [of a speech] and that they have rather too much inclined toward judicial oratory is clear; 12. but rhetoric is useful, [first] because the true and the just are by nature stronger than their opposites, so that if judgments are not made in the right way [the truth and the just] are necessarily defeated [by their opposites]. And this is worthy of censure. (page 35)
Wow, talk about a long sentence. I'm interested in the idea of censure. Is Aristotle suggesting that if what is being said or the 'judgement' is not true and just it should be censured? Who gets to decide what is true and just and what if something is true for one group of people but not for another?
If we were able to talk to Aristotle today, how would we explain the changes in our definition of rhetoric? When I wrote my paper regarding my knowledge on rhetoric I don't think I mentioned truth or justice in regards to contemporary rhetoric. I know it can be applied but it wasn't the first thing I considered.
One thing that interests me is the format of speeches that had been established in classical antiquity. Aristotle mentions prooeemion, diegesis (narration, statement of facts), pistosis (proof)--including tekmeria (proof from signs) and eikota (probabilities), and epilogos. Other models from art of speech manuals, such as Tisias' handbook, added proof and supplementary proof and refutation and supplementary refutation, as well as proposition, partition, and digression--I would like to know more about these. In an appendix Kennedy mentions that the form that Aristotle describes was used in one of Odysseus' speeches to Achilles in the Iliad (if memory serves it's the one where Odysseus attempts to bribe him into returning to battle). Kennedy also mentions an Egyptian Art of Speech manual from 2000 BC, and I am curious to know if a similar form is described therein.
I have a question about how hard and clear are the distinctions of aims of the various geni of rhetoric defined by Aristotle. The advantageous, the just, and the honorable seem to blend into one another despite Aristotle's attempt to disambiguate them.
In the opening of “The Usefulness of Rhetoric” is a passage I have been trying to puzzle out:
Rhetoric is useful [first] because the true and the just are by nature24 stronger than their opposites, so that if judgments are not made in the right way [the true and the just] are necessarily defeated [by their opposites]. And this is worthy of censure25. Further, even if we were to have the most exact knowledge, it would not be very easy for us in speaking to use it to persuade some audiences. (34)
I have placed a question mark in the margin of these lines. Claiming that the true and just are stronger than their opposites seems an audacious, if not unreal claim. Who are the true and the just? Define stronger. I wonder if the virtuous, whose qualities are listed and described in I.9, refer to the true and just here. For example, Aristotle later defines one of the virtues as “manly courage [andreia] [is a virtue] by which people perform fine actions in times of danger and as the law orders” (80). This definition is one of the more specific, although fine actions in times of danger is written in general terms that invite a myriad of interpretations. And coming at Aristotle through Kenneth Burke, I think of Burke’s terministic screens. I think many deceptive speakers with unvirtuous motives would run into a burning building to save someone, but take the same speaker away from a life-threatening situation and see of they would act with the same virtuous intent.
The last sentence in my selected passage above, having the “exact knowledge, it would not be very easy for us in speaking to use it to persuade some audiences.” I thought od delivery when I read this sentence and of the ability, and necessity, for a speaker to alter her style for different audiences. Experts do not always make the best teachers, and nor do they always make the most effective speakers. What good is the knowledge if an inflexibility of style, an inability to adapt, prevents the speaker from reaching her audience?
I think of Gertrude Stein’s novel The Making of Americans. Modernist scholars now argue that Stein’s repetition in this book is a pedagogical device. I also think of her style here as a rhetorical device that fails. I think highly of Stein’s intellect and have been curious about her ideas of memory and epistemology. But the repetition of here style so deadened me while I read (and never finished) that her rhetoric failed. Without adaptation—generalizing is one approach—delivery and the speaker (writer) will fail.
This response pertains to the glossary term/text highlighting task.
I found *diatribe* to be defined as: "dwelling on a subject; usually personal invective, often in digressions." Kennedy cites two contexts in which this term is used. The first, in 2.6.20, relates to the feeling of shame experienced when one's misdeeds are relayed to others: "And [people feel shame before those] whose employment is watching the errors of their neighbors, for example, professional jokesters and comic poets; for these are in a way slanderers and talebearers." Certainly such a propensity for diatribe (specifically personal invective) toward celebrities and politicians is characteristics of tabloid magazines, comics, and late-night talk show hosts. . . .
The second reference occurs in 3.17.10 where Aristotle notes that deliberative rhetoric (speeches from members of lawmaking bodies) rarely uses diatribe: "And [it] does not have many opportunities for diatribes, for example, against the opponent or about oneself or to create pathos. Least of all [species of rhetoric can deliberative do this], unless one digresses. Therefore, one should do this [only] when at a loss for something to say [. . .]."
Clearly times have changed.
Since we didn't get to my word in class I will post it here, and on the wiki later.
Proairesis: deliberate choice or moral purpose, adecision made on the basis of character (ethos)
1.1.14
Here it seemed to be used in the context of a person making a conscious choice to follow sophistic teachings because he believed them--the opposite example presented being the example of a rhetorician who's choice to follow rhetorical practices was based on ability. (At least this is what I gathered from it! If so, the contrast between choice and ability between sophists and rhetoricians is interesting!)
1.8.6
In this example proairesis is used as a decision of the audience to believe a speaker because of his character, or as an illustration of how a person's behavior defines his character
3.16.8
Here character is defined again by choice of actions. Emphasis on choice. Aristotle presents an example of math having no moral character beause there is no choice of action when performing it, while rhetoricians do have ethical choices of how they use their skills. (character linked to rhetoric?)
In a nutshell then, I would have to sum up this defenition to contain two parts:
1. a deliberate decision
2. decision made on basis of evaluation of character
I remained quite curious about Helen’s word diatribe so looked at the other passage (3.17.10) first in the Kennedy translation and then in the Freese (Loeb). The difference in translations is interesting. The Freese actually reads more smoothly but I suspect that the Kennedy is closer to the Greek. The word “diatribe” appears only in the Kennedy; Freese translates it “lingering.”
Kennedy:
Speaking in a deliberative assembly is more difficult than in a law court, as one would expect, since it is concerned with the future . . . . and the law is a hypothesis in judicial cases: having a starting point, it is easier for one to find proof. And deliberative oratory does not have many opportunities for diatribes, for example, against the opponent or about oneself or to create pathos. Least of all [species of rhetoric] can deliberative do this unless one digresses. Therefore, one should do this only when at a loss for something to say, as do the orators at Athens and Isocrates; for even when giving advice, he uses invective, for example, . . .
Freese:
Deliberative speaking is more difficult than forensic, and naturally so, because it has to do with the future; whereas forensic speaking has to do with the past, which is already known . . . . Further, the law is the subject in forensic speaking; and when one has a starting point, it is easier to find a demonstrative proof. Deliberative speaking does not allow many opportunities for lingering—for instance, attacks on the adversary, remarks about oneself, or attempts to arouse emotion. In this branch of Rhetoric, there is less room for these than in any other, unless the speaker wanders from the subject. Therefore, when at a loss for topics, one must do as the orators at Athens, amongst them Isocrates, for even when deliberating he brings accusations against . . . . .
Remember that the enthymeme, while using logic, does not have to be logical. It is satisfying to an audience because it has the appearance of being whole, due to its allegiance to and/or use of logic, but partakes in the pleasure of the emotions that so troubled SocraPlato. It can partake in the emotions precisely because they are associated with the useful premises of whatever argument the person using the enthymeme happens to be manipulating.
As an example, if I am constructing an argument around the faults of any given political party, based on some current news item, it is to my advantage to cite previous mistakes that have been committed by that party. Even if the party has already rid themselves of the problematic members who might have caused the previous mistakes, the citing of the list causes a pleasurable flush of knowing (in this case, that it's perfectly okay not to listen to those bastards, look at their track record), and because the previous instances cited are perceived to have happened, the listeners experiencing pleasure can feel both affirmed (I knew they were up to no good) and as if they have been given special knowledge (but I wasn't taken in, I'm not stupid.)
Fill in those blanks how you wish. That is an enthymatic argument built on classes (among other things); if the members of class A engage in certain activity, then they are all B, and likely to continue being B. The inference is not logical, but it is built of a classification system that is.
Some politicians are Republicans.
All politicians are up to no good.
Therefore, all Republicans are up to no good.
Oh, it doesn't have to be logical because, like any argument, it simplifies its terms and we confuse that simplification with the systematic exploration of and discarding of premises, which we conclude to be the process of arriving at the truth. Assuming, of course, that we buy that there are criteria that can be used to flatly negate some possibilities. I think, though, that categorical negation is difficult, at best, and like all utopian concepts, relies on static terms for the universe. (That's certainly what the capital-t-truth relies on.)
Daniella, I would love to hear you apply trying to reason with your students to our discussions on how to argue, if it helps. I think that one of the advantages of taking these kinds of classes while you are teaching (which I wish I was), is that it gives you the chance to try out all our wild ideas about how to teach/argue/think. Nothing wrong with 'this doesn't work because.' There are a lot of academic arguments that are, basically, 'this is why you can't do that out here where I work.' bell hooks, for instance.
And I want to crib off all you guys that teach in the K-12 system; it's likely to be where I go after graduation, so I have some ulterior motive.
Apologia (1.3.3, 1.10, 1.12.7, and 3.13.3) I looked up the word apologia On Rhetoric. Kennedy only cites four instances of the word in the translation- all are used when Aristotle talks about judicial rhetoric- in a defensive speech. In 1.3.3 “in the law courts there is either accusation or defense [apologia].” Aristotle does not say they must be sorry for their action but must present one of the two arguments in matters of judicial rhetoric. In 1.10.1, he once again uses it when he describes the 2 types of judicial rhetoric (which roughly translate to our current courts of law to be prosecution and defense). Again in 1.12.7 he uses apologia to mean defense, though Kennedy has not used the Greek work apologia. There is no apparent Greek word, apologia, or the English defense in the last instance 3.13.3. I am not sure which word or phrase Kennedy is referring to in the passage.
I was thinking that Aristotle might have used the word like an apology but instead the word apologia seems to mean defense. It's funny that the word has survived and in a court of law we use the word 'defense' like Aristotle uses 'apologia.'
Post a Comment