This is a little late, hopefully not too late.
In Book One, last week on Tuesday (I think; time blurs), we discussed the passage on my page 30, about enthymatic proofs, handbook writers and the court system. In my translation (an older version of Kennedy) "... these writers say nothing about enthymemes, which is the 'body' of persuasion, while they give most of their attention to matters external to the subject; for verbal attack and pity and anger and such emotions of the soul do not relate to fact but are appeals to the juryman."
I believe this section to be about the inability of casual thinkers and teachers (and I believe Aristotle is comparing handbook writers to casual or careless thinkers and teachers) to consider the societal and further-reaching consequences of immediate manipulation. To my understanding enthymemes themselves do contain a significant appeal to ethos or pathos, meaning that they will appeal to the emotions of the jurists, but that there is also a limited appeal to logos (Aristotle's favorite of the species of appeal), specifically in the fact that a manipulation of enthymemes requires societal analysis. In order to recognize the species of logic used in a particular enthymeme (which does not, itself, have to be logical; logic is a relationship between premises and conclusion, logical is the net result of the argument), the examiner has to be very aware of what does appeal to the audience (which Aristotle appears to believe is an important part of enthymatic thinking) and also what kind of reason underlies the particular societal reasoning cited by the arguer. Aristotle loves to go into lists anytime he can with types of appeals, so things like 'for the greater good' or 'the benefit of many' arguments might serve here, if the arguer was capable of identifying the specific interests involved and what assumptions they make about group members (in this case, of people who will be benefited by the good in question and members of the many.) Aristotle does mock the emotional appeal which 'warps' a jury (and who would warp a ruler before using it; though, in the case of a judge and jury, he has little faith in their ability to discern truth in any objective sense), but enthymatic argument, given that it maintains the ability to deal in abstractions (like the location of the warrant of any argument, for a group of people, and more importantly for him, the long-view of the effects of any particular decisions-- he picks up his Plato here, because law-maker can decide and no one else is objective enough) does not have to suffer his onus as long as it can predict beyond the first stirrings of emotional effect on the target audience.
Of course, this means that enthymemes are a species of argument that manipulates pathos and ethos using logos, and since Aristotle believes logos to be the better of that triad, I think this is accurate.
But I reserve the right to be wrong, at any time, but hopefully not fatally so.
2 comments:
I think your ideas are as valid as any and I would submit that, based on the thinness of Aristotle's writing, it would be impossible to be "wrong." In fact, I'd say your analysis of the idea of logic (or lack of logic, or logic becoming itself through the argument?) helps me make more sense of the little that Aristotle does say.
So here's a question for you--do other species of argument manipulate the triad in different ways? I think every form of argument is a manipulation of some sort. Curious to know what you think.
The lack of clarity in many of Aristotle’s passages was in sharp contrast to his vision of the codification of Rhetoric. Without Kennedy’s notes, reading it would be difficult at the least. With all Aristotle’s discussion of ethos and the importance of the presentation of the ‘speaker,’ he did not use these elements in On Rhetoric. As Kennedy mentions, Aristotle did not clarify many of his points. I also find it interesting that in each section he takes the time to define his terms and he tries to explain through his constant reference to the speeches of other Sophists or incidents in the courts. I find this a little weird, because at other times he insults the Sophists or Isocrates. But it shows his knowledge of common speeches, and an awareness of the public views of Rhetoric. Another interesting point is his reevaluation of the definition of Rhetoric, it is as if he wrote certain points, and then reevaluates the previous definition to redefine it. I also appreciate that he includes both Plato’s view of rhetoric as well as those ideas presented by the Sophists/Isocrates. These areas of slippage in his presentation show that he most likely used these as lecture notes, not as a published book.
Despite these weaknesses, he cleverly comes up with ideas that stood the test of time and remain basic tenets in America’s courts of law or in the House and the Senate. The first is his classification of the branches of Rhetoric: judicial, legislative and epideictic (ceremonial). We certainly see these aspects in our own government today.
In his discussion of judicial rhetoric, he uses discusses apologia, defense, and kategoria, accusation. In our courts, we obviously still use these two areas in the American courtroom: defense and prosecution. So instead of necessary apologizing for behavior, we can use judicial rhetoric to clear our name. He also brings up the difference between morality (or internal governing of an individual) and community law. I think he questions where one begins and the other one takes over. He seems to bring up, as Kennedy indicates, that he is in search of coming up with a law that is in the middle. Especially in chapter 13, he sees gaps in the two, “omitted by the specific and written law” and he wants to fill it. Later on he brings up the idea of punishment, where the punishment should fit the crime. And even mentions victim’s rights, that the victim (or those wronged) should have recourse. He is even brilliant enough to question premeditation, 1st degree crimes, as separate from (and more severe) than others. And finally, he seems quite against torture to obtain witness testimony—an ideology that remains today.
I also really appreciate Aristotle’s use of psychology (or rather understanding and classification of it) to understand how to sway the audience to determine “all available means of persuasion.” He defines the topoi or topics that are useful for each specific area of rhetoric as well as rhetoric as a whole. I thought it was interesting that he talks about the psychology of pleasure, the psychology of those wronged and those who did wrong, and the psychology of good. Through understanding these aspects of psychology, he shows arguments that contain these elements, topoi, are more effective in moving the audience. I also think these elements are common knowledge, but maybe in his day they were not common knowledge or maybe they had not been classified so they could be easy to use.
One thing that I was confused about was the idea of the ‘greater and the lesser.’ I believe it is categorizing arguments to more effectively use them. I also find it strange that Aristotle and Plato (as well as other later Rhetors) emphasized the logos and the use of hypotaxis. He uses hypotaxis, the use of subordinate clauses or other grammatical structures to show the subordination of ideas, prominently to show that the main ideas are superior to the minor points. But he does not use it effectively, especially when he goes off on tangents or other unrelated materials. I think though parataxis, was considered less important and not as sophisticated, it might have made Aristotle’s points more clear. And possibly forced him to work out the presentation of his ideas in clear ,concise matter.
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