I've created an assignment to be accessed at
http://www.unm.edu/~sromano/english542/wiki.htm
Now, I know in class we talked about posting your Greek words to blogspot (here). And you can still do that. But now that I've experimented a bit with the wiki and given you some technical instructions, I'd really prefer that you post your work there. Think about it: the wiki will have a certain nebulous permanance (unless someone accidentally deletes it). Other student at UNM English will build upon and modify your postings. You can go back and bask in the pleasure of your own words! You can engage in an editing war with an unknown collaborator. You will learn how a wiki works and can then incorporate wiki-dom into your course syllabi or your own professional writing public presence. You owe it to teachers and professional writers in our program to lead the way.
Which of Aristotles emotions am I trying to invoke here?
The wiki:
http://greekrhetoricalterms.pbwiki.com/List-of-the-Terms-in-the-Greek-Rhetorical-Terms-Wiki
So let's go for the wiki. Problems? Let me know. Sarah brings her computer--we can gather round and see how it works.
6 comments:
Ok, I think I got all my words posted to the wiki properly. I will list them here too just in case. I am only showing my additions, not any pervious content. All but my last word have definitions from Pernot. Sorry for the multiple posting styles. I did this in several sittings and I didn’t realize the variation until I pulled this list together for the blog.
1. Didaskein: to teach (Pernot 5)
2. Peitho:
In Rhetoric in Antiquity, Pernot identifies peitho with two definitions:
1. Seduction and trickery, as a
link to the previously
mentioned Aphrodite
2. Refusal of violence and the
search for a good social order
(Here I am assuming this is in
relation to persuasion, where
the goal was to use peitho as
an alternate form of conflict
resolution.)
Pernot also states that peitho “reflects on the ambiguous powers of the spoken word, capable at once of truth, justice, and mendacity” citing Hesiod’s Theogeny and the Homeric Hymn to Hermes as examples (8). This reflects the concern that peitho, and speech in general, had ways to influence an audience but had no obligation to ethics or morality.
3. and 4. Isegoria / Parrhesia:
Isegoria is a Greek term for freedom of speech, having a connotation that the ability to speak freely comes as a direct consequence of a country having total political equality. (Pernot) This creates a link between discourse and its use in political institutions.
Parrhesia is another word for freedom of speech used by Pernot, and one used more frequently in his writing. (34, 70, 231) Pernot defines the term as freedom of speech in "the role of public discourse, in particular of debate and deliberation, as well as to the figure of the orator as counselor to the people." Later he also uses the term in defining bluntness, meaning the insistence of speaking freely and frankly.
While Pernot never formally distinguishes between Isegoria and Parrhesia, it appears that Isegoria relates more to the idea and cause of having free speech, while Parrhesia relates to its actual practice in a conversation.
5. Eikos: likelihood of something being true (Pernot 10)
6. Kairos:
In Rhetoric in Antiquity, Pernot also discusses the idea of kairos implying a Greek idea of situational ethics that change according to what is demanded by a situation (13). He further uses this as evidence that there were no solid ideas of truth or justice to constrain rhetoric.
7. Eristic: art of refutation and verbal conflict (Pernot 14)
8. Epideixeis: public lecture (Pernot 15, 21)
9. Ideai: forms of speech (Pernot 39)
10. Hedone: Charm. Also connected with pleasure and sweetness. (Pernot 225)
11. Aletheia:
This term is used in Hermogenes system of style as one of seven key categories that determines the tone of what is said. Aletheia stands for truthfulness in this context, though it is not clear from Pernot's explanation if this means that the speaker tells the truth or only appears truthful. (The other six categories include clarity, grandeur, beauty, liveliness, character, and forcefulness.) Pernot-165
12. Deinos: forceful
Referred to as a genre of style in Demitrios' On Style, along with grand middle and simple. The deinos style is characterized by vigor, compactness, spontaneity, and abruptness, with the works of Demosthenes and Demades presented as examples (Pernot 60).
13. Logos:
In Rhetoric in Antiquity, Pernot introduces the idea that logos is supposed to charm and bewitch (17). This is discussed in the context of Gorgias using this idea as a justification for his artistic and highly artificial prose. This discussion also draws from previous mention of logos as having power to sway an audience in discourse.
14. Topoi: commonplaces (Pernot 43)
This word from Aristotle, On Rhetoric
15. Proairesis: deliberate choice or moral purpose, a decision made on the basis of character (ethos)
1.1.14
Here it seemed to be used in the context of a person making a conscious choice to follow sophistic teachings because he believed them--the opposite example presented being the example of a rhetorician who's choice to follow rhetorical practices was based on ability. (At least this is what I gathered from it! If so, the contrast between choice and ability between sophists and rhetoricians is interesting!)
1.8.6
In this example proairesis is used as a decision of the audience to believe a speaker because of his character, or as an illustration of how a person's behavior defines his character
3.16.8
Here character is defined again by choice of actions. Emphasis on choice. Aristotle presents an example of math having no moral character because there is no choice of action when performing it, while rhetoricians do have ethical choices of how they use their skills. (character linked to rhetoric?)
In a nutshell then, I would have to sum up this definition to contain two parts:
1. a deliberate decision
2. decision made on basis of evaluation of character
I posted info on two words that were already on the Wiki, but am not sure about creating new terms, so here is my backup.
Aretē – excellence, moral virtue. “On Rhetoric” 1.6.6: “virtues are productive of good things and matters of action.” 1.9.4: “an ability for doing good in many and great ways, actually in all ways in all things.”
Diabolē – prejudicial attack or slander in a speech. “On Rhetoric” 3.15
Elenkhos – refutation. “On Rhetoric” 3.17.14: “Refutations of the opponent are not a separate species but belong to proofs.”
Epieikeia – fair-mindedness. “On Rhetoric” 1.2.4:”fair-mindedness on the part of the speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness”
Eudokimounta – expressions that are well-liked by audiences. “On Rhetoric” 3.10.1, 2:”there is need to say what are the sources of urbanities and well-liked expressions. . . .To learn easily is naturally pleasant to all people, and words signify something, so whatever words create knowledge in us are pleasurable.”
Kalon – what is fine, good to look upon, honorable, or noble, as praised in epideictic. “On Rhetoric” 1.3.5: “for those praising and blaming [the end] is the honorable [kalon] and the shameful” 1.9.3: “Now kalon describes whatever, through being chosen itself, is praiseworthy or whatever, through being good, is pleasant because it is good.”
Krisis – judgment, as made by an assembly or jury. “On Rhetoric” 2.1.2: “But since rhetoric is concerned with making a judgment (people judge what is said in deliberation, and judicial proceedings are also a judgment), it is necessary not only to look to the arguments that it may be demonstrative and persuasive but also [for the speaker] to construct a view of himself as a certain kind of person and to prepare the judge”
Parabolē – comparison, a form of example. “On Rhetoric” 2.20.2-4: “for to speak of things that have happened before is one species of paradigm and to make up [an illustration] is another. Of the latter, comparison [parabole] is one kind”
Pro ommatōn poiein – bringing-before-the-eyes, visualization in artistic style. “On Rhetoric” 3.10.6: “Furthermore, [urbanity is achieved] by means bringing-before-the-eyes [pro ommatōn poiein, “visualization”]; for things should be seen as being done rather than as going to be done.”
Psogos – blame, invective, the negative form of epideictic. “On Rhetoric” 1.3.3:”In epeideictic, there is either praise [epainos] or blame [psogos].”
Saphes – clarity, the virtue of style. “On Rhetoric” 3.2.1:”let the virtue of style be defined as “to be clear” [saphē] (speech is a kind of sign, so if it does not make clear it will not perform its function)”
Sympheron – what is advantageous or beneficial to a speaker or audience, the subject of deliberative oratory. “On Rhetoric” 1.3.5:”for the deliberative speaker [the end] is the advantageous [sympheron]”
Tekmērion – a necessarily valid sign. “On Rhetoric” 1.2.16: “In the case of signs [sēmeia], some are related as the particular to the universal, some as the universal to the particular. Of these, a necessary sign is a tekmērion”
Theoros – a spectator or observer, one who listens to a speech but is not asked to take action, as in epideictic. “On Rhetoric” 1.3.2: “Now it is necessary for the hearer to be either an observer [theoros] or a judge”
Topos – topic; a mental ‘place” where an argument can be found or the argument itself. “On Rhetoric” 1.2.21: “I am saying that dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are those in which we state topoi, and these are applicable in common to questions of justice and physics and politics and many different species [of knowledge]”
“Ancient Rhetorics for Contemporary Students” p. 76: “topics existed in the structures of language or in the issues that concerned the community.”
1. Apodeixis: "Aristotle's technical term for logically valid, scientific demonstration" (Kennedy 33).
2. Arete: Virtue, usually associated with aristocracy (Glenn 184). As Marrou showed that Greek society and education grew from militaristic to aristocratic, the evolution of the meaning and context of arete tracks that growth. Arete originally meant the excellence of a brave and noble warrior, and came to mean civic virtue within the polis (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald, 312).
3. Episteme: Learning (Pernot 219). Knowledge of any kind, but especially objective, disinterested scientific knowledge (Ostwald 307).
4. Eristic: The art of refutation and verbal conflict, practiced and prized by the sophists. (Pernot 14)
5. Gnome: Maxim (Pernot 219). "Literally . . . 'a thought,' usually an opinion given as judgment or advice" (Kennedy 164). "An assertion . . . of a general sort" (Aristotle in Kennedy 165). "A particular insight or judgment, especially as related to matters affecting the conduct of one's life" (Ostwald 308).
6. Kairos: The critical moment for persuasion, which implies a "situational ethic" (Pernot 13); one that may change from one moment, one speech, to another. This ethic made Aristotle and Plato uneasy, but was a major tenet of sophists like Gorgias. "The circumstances obtaining at the moment of an oration (Jarratt, Sophists 11)
7. Logon Tekhnai: "skills of speeches" (Pernot 22)
8. Nomos: Beliefs, laws, customs, mores (Glenn 36). Also, "Arrangement of discourse to creat socially significant knowledge . . . a social construct with ethical demensions" (Jarratt qtd in Glenn 190)
9. Oiko: Property, private world of home and belongings (Glenn 24)
10. Phronesis: Virtue of prudence, related to deliberative wisdom (Pernot 35, 227). In Plato, seen as synonymous with sophia (wisdom), but Aristotle refines the term to imply "wisdom in action," or "practical wisdom." (Ostwald 303)
11. Pisteis: Kennedy: "proof, means of persuasion, belief." By embodying both the actions of the speaker and the audience, this implies a kind of persuasive trajectory that moves from one to the other. I wonder if it also suggests that persuasion has a circular nature: the speaker must believe something in order to offer proof of it to someone else, who in turn must believe it before proving it to another person. (Posted on the wiki)
12. Polis: City, public world of discourse (Glenn 24)
13. Sophia: "Aristotle understands by sophia the highest intellectual, and especially philisophical, excellence of which the human mind is capable" (Ostwald 313).
14. Tekhne: Art, not as an artistic creation, but as a reasoned method; a system of rules meant for practical use, a craft (Pernot x). A reasoned habit of mind in making something (Kennedy 31).
15. Topoi: Kennedy says that Aristotle doesn't define topos in Topics or Rhetoric, "a sign that he assumed the word would be easily understood" (45). In 1.2.21, Aristotle says topoi "are applicable in common to questions of justice and physics and politics and many different species of knowledge." The most common definition of topoi are "commonplaces." Pernot says they "are the means for finding ideas. They consist of lists of predefined rubrics to which the orator turns when he wants to handle a given subject and which suggest arguments to him, with the stipulation that he adapt these general suggestions to the individual case he is arguing" (223). This seems to fit Aristotle's insistence that Rhetoric's arena is the general and not the specific: "if he succeeds in hitting on first principles, the knowledge will no longer be dialectic or rhetoric, but the science of which the speaker grasps the first principles" (Kennedy 46). Topoi, then, are places where knowledge of specific subjects overlaps. They are elements common to all disciplines, and therefore commonly understood. Examples of Aristotle's topoi are happiness, goodness, virtue, honor, reputation and friendship. (Posted on the wiki)
I've just posted my second word, giving me enthymeme and hypokrisis.
I hope these two count as rich text entries. And I'll continue to publish more entries each day.
I also think I've worked out all the kinks with the technical side; I'm getting comfortable with the interface.
Gerard
Enthymeme Aristotle calls a "rhetorical syllogism an enthymeme," a device that produces "logical persuasion" (Kennedy 40). They "are derived from probabilities [eikota] and signs [sēmeia], so it is necessary that each of these be the same as each [of the truth values mentioned]" (43). However, according to Lanham, Arisotle distinguishes enthymeme[s] as using premises that are only "generally true" from syllogism[s],which contain premises that are "absolutely true (scientifically proved)" (65). So an enthymeme uses a premise unsupported by empirical evidence, a seemingly logical expression of the unwhole truth. In terms of logic, Lanham defines it as an "abridged Syllogism, one of the terms being omitted as understood."
If Plato thinks that desire impairs the judgment of a lover,
then falling in love is a form of insanity. (adapted from Phaedrus 10)
This example omits the proposition that Plato is widely studied, therefore his theory on the adverse effect of eros on the mind is valid. Kennedy calls this omitted (assumed) proposition a "suppression [that] flatters the vanity of those to whom one speaks by leaving something to their intelligence" (297). Moreover, this assumption demands that the orator know her audience, specifically their level of intelligence, otherwise the orator's appeal to vanity will fail.
hypokrisis Aristotle nearly dismisses hypokrisis [delivery] as an art that has “not yet been composed,” while offering that “everything except demonstration is incidental; but, nevertheless, [delivery] has great power … because of the corruption of the audience” (Kennedy 218–19). And Lanham says less but no more with “[orator’s] delivery” (87). However, Pernot extends these definitions by contrasting Greek rhetoric with an emerging Roman rhetoric in the first century B.C., at the end of the Republic: “the traditional rhetorical model of the senatorial aristocracy took a beating at the hands of orators with a preference for prosecution … they used violent forms of pathos, begged and pleaded for sympathy (miseratio), and gesticulated wildly. Hence rhetoric warred with rhetoric” (93). He further explains the historical moment as one in which “an atmosphere of permanent revolution prevailed [through] acts of violence, corruption, and stress on institutions, assemblies, and courts” (93). Hypokrisis is the manifestation of the five canons of persuasion, the expression of rhetorical power, regardless of the goodness or the corruption of the orator and the audience.
Oikos- family lineage. "women remained excluded from the worldly pursuits, often meeting with her husband only long enough to guarantee her pregnancy and thereby her husband's oikos" (Glenn,24)Cheryl Glenn places a gender on oikos when she writes "But Sappho, the original poet of female desire, came to writing within the feminized oikos. (23)
Oikos - the opposite of the polis. Glenn seperates the two in reference to gender "women were subordinated to the oikos, while men remained in the polis." (Glenn 23)
ekdosis: marriage. Greek word that also means "loan" (Glenn 24)
thiasos: education by way of an all-female fellowship. (Glenn 24) Glenn quotes Riane Eisler in support of this definition, "such an education as a form of celebrating female life-giving and life-sustaining sources." (Eisler 115)
hetaireiai: band of noble friends (Glenn 24)
logographos: a hired writer of courtoom speeches (Glenn 34) George Kennedy translates logographoi to mean "a prose writer" or "a speech wirter for litigants in court". Aristotle uses it to mean speechwriter.(3.7.7)
I don't know if anyone is going to even see this comment, at this point, but I wanted to share something I figured out all on my lonesome as I was readig through the Arendt Article, (which, by the way, is an awesome read if anyone hasn't read it yet. Lots of good info and Greek Words galore.)
On page 29, near the top: "the very term 'political economy' would have been a contradiction in terms. Whatever was 'economic,' related to the life of the individual and the survival of the species, was a non-political, household affair by definition."
The thought occurred to me that the root of Economy is ECON and OIKOS sounds connected, that with the idea that the politics (POLIS) and Economy could not work together... made me curious. So, on this hunch, I checked in my Dictionary of Etymology, and found:
"Economy...Greek OIKONOMIA, from OIKONOMOS manager, steward (OIKOS house + -NOMOS managing, from NEMEIN manage)."
I was rather proud of myself. This stuff is finally starting to make some sense... with a week left of the semester, heh.
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